Introduction
The concern of this chapter, as that of the book as a whole, is to explore contemporary relationships between Muslim minorities and the state, with a particular focus upon structural and cultural dynamics.
* In this regard the case of Britain is illustrative. This is because an analysis of political and institutional responses to Muslim 'difference' in Britain details a pattern of engagement that has evolved over a period of time. This can be framed in terms of rising agendas of racial equality and multiculturalism to which Muslims have become central -even while they have challenged important aspects of these. This implies that these developments have neither been linear nor unproblematic, and have been characterised by various ongoing contestations and revisions. 1 According to some authors, what this engagement has accomplished presently looks to be in retreat and at best remains uncertain. 2 Indeed, Prime Minister
Cameron in particular has, since his time in opposition, has characterized British multiculturalism as a 'barrier' dividing British society .
Subsequently, in office, he has argued that 'the doctrine of 'state multiculturalism' has encouraged culturally different people to live apart from one another and apart from the mainstream' (5 February 2011) . Perhaps seeking to stake out a British Leitkultur,
Cameron has also complained that multiculturalism has led to the minimization of Christianity as a guiding public ethos, and has 'allowed segregated communities to behave in ways that run completely counter to our values and has not contained that extremism but allowed it to grow and prosper '. 3 It is our argument that these sentiments should not obscure several significant ways in which Muslim minorities and British citizenship have been cast in dynamic and mutually constitutive terms. Indeed, we suggest that contrary to a popular insistence following the 7/7 London bombings and other terrorist incidents involving British
Muslim protagonists, multiculturalism in Britain has not been erased. 4 Indeed, while for a while scholars took the rhetorical failure demise of multiculturalism at face value, this is now being empirically rebutted. 5 In this chapter we specifically contend that any discussion of Muslim minorities in 21 st century Britain must not ignore the following developments for they too may affect the course of future state-Muslim engagement. In order to substantiate these assertions this chapter will begin with a discussion of the sociological and political character of British citizenship, before offering an account of the cultures and identities of contemporary British Muslim communities. It will then empirically elaborate cases of state-Muslim engagement within multiculturalist -including multi-faith -arenas, and trace the structuralcultural dynamics therein.
British Multiculturalism and its Muslims
While there has been a long-established Muslim presence in Britain, particularly comprising North African (especially Yemeni) and East Indian sea-faring migrants and 'lascars' 6 , the major and most established part of Britain's Muslim presence is the outcome of post-war Commonwealth migration. This came from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, initially in the form of male labour from rural small farm owning backgrounds seeking to meet the demands of unskilled and semi-skilled labour, and was later joined by families and then more urban and professional South Asian
Muslim political refugees from Kenya and Uganda. These migrants from former colonies and dependent territories entered a socio-political environment that would
give specific emphasis to managing group relations. As such Britain borrowed something from the American experience, but went further in focusing upon how society could achieve fair treatment for different groups, something that reaches beyond how these groups could blend into society. 7 Without an official 'Multicultural Act' or 'Charter' in the way of Australia or Canada 8 , Britain rejected the notion that the incorporation of migrants should be premised upon an uncompromising cultural 'assimilation'. It did so when the Labour Home Secretary Roy Jenkins 9 defined integration as "not a flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance." This sentiment tried to address the rights of distinct groups as well as their modes of interaction, and so was not merely concerned with the rights of individuals. This is how, at the level of Favell's 'philosophies of integration' at least, we might begin to characterize the specificity of 'British multiculturalism.' 17 , and this has in turn informed the national picture.
Indeed, it was through debates at the local level regarding multicultural education that one of the leading public policy documents on multiculturalism arose. Entitled
Education for All, the Swann Report 18 characterised multiculturalism in Britain as enabling …all ethnic groups, both minority and majority, to participate in fully shaping society…whilst also allowing, and where necessary assisting the ethnic minority communities in maintaining their distinct ethnic identities within a framework of commonly accepted values.
Yet this limited multiculturalism explicitly precluded such things as state support of linguistic pluralism (in terms of teaching in "mother tongue" as opposed to a language like Urdu being an out-of-school subject) or the expansion of religious schools, seeking instead to make each matters of private concern. It has taken Muslim minorities decades of engagement to begin to expand such multiculturalist approaches in a way that also takes their particular needs into account, specifically by contesting its secular and narrowly racial focus. This is an example of the 'multi' in Modood's "multi family resemblances," in so far as different types of group claims, and different types of groups labels, may emerge under the purview of multicultural accommodations. 19 The second reason derives from global events, and not necessarily from the acts of terrorism undertaken by protagonists proclaiming a Muslim agenda (which are routinely condemned by leading British-Muslim bodies), but from the subsequent conflation of a criminal minority with an assumed tendency inherent to the many.
Indeed, in a post 9/11 and 7/7 climate, the explanatory purchase of Muslim cultural dysfunctionality has generated a profitable discursive economy in accounting for what has been described as 'Islamic terrorism'. 33 The net outcome of these two issues is a coupling of diversity and anti-terrorism agendas that has implicated contemporary British multiculturalism as the culprit of Britain's security woes. Gilles Kepel 34 , for example, has insisted that the bombers "were the children of Britain's own multicultural society" and that the bombings have "smashed" the implicit social consensus and multiculturalism to "smithereens". More recently, Prins and Salisbury 35 have claimed that a misplaced deference to multiculturalism, which failed to lay down the line to immigrants, has contributed to a lack of national selfconfidence and a fragmenting society that has been exploited by Islamist terrorists. As
Modood has argued, however, "the simplistic linkage between home-grown terrorism and the multicultural project is unfair because it ends up blaming not just national policies but specific communities for particular outcomes." In this case, Muslims as a whole are blamed for terrorism, for not standing up to extremism and for not integrating, which not only appears unfair "but also divisive and so not likely to achieve the much-sought-for integration."
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Contemporary Muslim Identity Articulations
At the same time, and whilst Britain has undoubtedly witnessed some securitization of ethnic relations, it is not quite the case, as one commentator has suggested, that public policy solutions aimed at managing ethnic and religious diversity amount to being "tough on mosques, tough on the causes of mosques". 37 To This is one example of a successful accommodation of aspects of Shar'ia even while Shar'ia councils themselves continue to be the subject of intense controversy. Muslim engagement with the state proceeds in a context that is characterized by an internal religious plurality which has been supplemented by the migration of different religious groups over the last two centuries. 54 To be sure, and in spite of maintaining a Bangladeshi groups have younger age profiles. Moreover, it is of course common amongst many experiences of migration that people establish themselves in localities that allow for the sharing of resources and a general feeling of security, before social mobility facilitates a move outward. 65 The important structural component that is too frequently absent from this discussion is the change that takes place around such minorities, and which is no more reducible to minority cultural features than the structural elements that invited initial settlement.
A particularly stark structural component shaping the lives of Britain's Muslim minorities is their socioeconomic profile which is significantly lower than their counterparts. For example, Abrams and Houston found that Muslims have disproportionately lower incomes and higher rates of unemployment, and that they have comparatively lower skills both in education and in vocational training.
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Muslim minorities are also more likely to reside in deprived housing and disproportionately suffer from bad health. 67 This is illustrated by the finding that 68 percent of Bangladeshi households live below the poverty line and about 40 percent of Muslim children in London live in poverty. 68 It has, however, been argued that these features are in truth an ethnic phenomenon rather than a religious one since nonPakistani and non-Bangladeshi Muslims such as Indians and African-Asians fair much better according to these indices. What this ignores is that while ethnic origin analyses shows significant variations across Muslim groups, and demonstrate that not all Muslim ethnic groups are equally disadvantaged, the most disadvantaged groups mainly consist of Muslim ethnic groups e.g., Muslims with an Indian background will perform less well than Hindus with an Indian background. 69 The outcome as a whole is that Muslims minorities represent a much weaker group in the labour market and Muslims as a whole have an increased reliance on state benefits, and so forth.
One important factor related to this could be deemed cultural and has to do with the greater levels of non-participation of Muslim women in the labour market. For example, according to the last Census only around 28 percent of Pakistani women and 22 percent percent of Bangladeshi women are in employment. 70 One of the most frequent explanations of this trend is to attribute it to a lack of suitable qualifications and educational training. It is significant then to note a counter-cyclical trend which reports that over the last decade Pakistani and Bangladeshi girls have become more likely than boys to achieve 5 G.C.S.E's at grades A*-C. 71 This is not something limited to tertiary education for, according to Bagguley and Hussein, while the past two decades has seen a general expansion of participation in higher education, "the increasing participation of South Asian women, especially those of Pakistani and
Bangladeshi origin, has surpassed all expectations". 72 This includes a leap in the percentages of women entering university between 1979 to 2000 with Pakistani ethnicities from 1.7 to 14.5 percent, and for the same period for women of Bangladeshi ethnicity from 1.6 to 12.5 percent. 73 In broad terms, this might be explained by migrant attitudes toward success in which ethnic minority cultural dynamics serve a positive function. This includes how "parents, other significant relatives and community members share some general, but durable, ambitions to achieve upward mobility for themselves and especially for their children and believe that (higher) education is important in achieving those ambitions, and so prioritize the acquisition of (higher) education,". The provenance of these working groups and their recommendations rests in a broader strategy which the British government had been cumulatively developing since the events of 9/11. Known as CONTEST, this broad-ranging counter-terrorism strategy was launched in 2003 and comprised of four components concerned with meeting the objectives of Pursuit (to stop terrorist attacks); Preparedness (to mitigate their impact where they cannot be stopped); Protection (to strengthen overall protection against terrorist attacks), and Prevention (to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremists). It is this last objective that was given added impetus upon the news that British Muslims had planned and carried out the London bombings, and it is the objective that has most overtly sought the interactive involvement of British Muslim communities at large. It is therefore unsurprising to learn that a strategy premised upon entering, and to some extent reformulating, the life worlds of British Muslim communities has been the subject of critical debate in the study of ethnic relations more broadly. 78 That this intention was salient could be gleaned from the fact that immediately after the London bombing, the Home Office signalled that it would establish The Commission on Integration and Cohesion (COIC) "to advise on how, consistent with their own religion and culture, there is better integration of those parts of the community inadequately integrated".
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In this way the Prevent strategy signals some diffusion of formal responsibilities for policy implementation and service delivery in a way that some perceive as indicative of broader development in 'governance' practices whereby "responsibility and accountability for a wide range of social issues is increasingly focused towards local levels, whilst at the same time centralised control in terms of resources and targetsetting is maintained". 80 While not immediately apparent in the earlier quotation, the incorporation too of faith-based groups from within the third sector is potentially part of a novel approach of engaging with religious minorities through the practices and models of representation, stakeholders, and advocacy in the consultative arena.
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What this discussion is trying to elaborate on is the manner in which the Prevent agenda, in constituting part of the broad counter-terrorism strategy, appears to be simultaneously subject to at least two broader prevailing dynamics comprising:
…the implementation of anti-terrorist laws that can be used disproportionately against Muslims leading to the potential for their increased surveillance and control and thereby serving to reduce Muslims' trust of state institutions, while at the same time pursuing approaches that acknowledge, and stress the importance of, the involvement of British…Muslim communities in helping to combat extremism. 82 Indeed, Spalek and Imoual frame these dynamics relationally in terms of "harder" and "softer" strategies of engagement, whereby the former may be understood as consisting of various means of surveillance, policing and intelligence gathering, and so on. 83 The latter, meanwhile, would include the development of dialogue, participation and community feedback between Muslim communities, state agencies and voluntary organizations in a way that may serve to increase trust in "the battle for hearts and minds". For example, the Prevent strategy emphasises, and seeks to extend to Muslims long-established equality traditions historically orientated toward ethnic and racial minorities:
The Prevent strategy requires a specific response, but we must also make the most of the links with wider community work to reduce inequalities, tackle racism and other forms of extremism (e.g. extreme far right), build cohesion and empower communities […] Likewise, it is recognised that the arguments of violent extremists, which rely on creating a 'them' and an 'us', are less likely to find traction in cohesive communities. 84 This builds upon recognition within government policies and legislation of Muslim religious difference that has been manifested in other ways, including measures against religious discrimination as set out in the Equality Act 2010. The tensions, then, surround the extent to which the prevailing British citizenship being extended to Muslims-through social and community cohesion agendas-are twinned with or placed within the same register as anti/counter-terrorism strategies that import or rely upon certain securitized 'hard' aspects of this dimension of state-Muslim engagement.
The risk is that Muslim active citizenship is to some extent framed in terms of demonstrable counter-terrorism activities, in a way which assumes that Muslim communities at large remain the "locus of the issue of extremism". 85 The most recent report from the Prime Minister's Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism (2013) continues to reflects many of these same tensions in surmising that violent extremism 'is a distinct ideology which should not be confused with traditional religious practice' (p. 2), and that 'extremism is less likely to be tolerated by communities which come together to challenge it. Britain is stronger because of its open, multi-faith and multi-racial communities, which can tackle extremists together and challenge the view that it is not possible to be a true Muslim and be integrated in British society' (p. 4).
British Muslim Citizenship and the Re-Balancing of Multiculturalism
What these examples begin to illustrate is that the state of multiculturalism in Britain does not mirror the "drastic break with multiculturalism" recently made by the Dutch. 86 This has seen the Netherlands discontinue some emblematic multiculturalist policies while introducing others specifically tailored to ignore ethnic minority differences. This includes the large-scale abandonment of dual-citizenship programmes; a withdrawal of national-level funding for minority group organizations and activities supporting cultural difference; reallocating the small percentage of public broadcasting time dedicated to multicultural issues; a proposed banning of the wearing of the burka in public places through an act of parliament; and a cessation of ethnic monitoring of labour market participation. 87 Neither does it confirm Favell's insistence that:
[O]ur tried-and-tested narratives and models of postwar immigration in Europe-the standard discussions of immigration, integration and citizenship, based on post-colonial, guestworker and asylum models, and historical distinctions between pre-and post-1973 trends-are finished.
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In contrast, what has been taking place in Britain is more like a movement from a perceived neglect to affirmation of 'Britishness' presented as a meta-membership with which all, including Muslim minorities and non-Muslim majorities, should engage. assimilation into a common culture so that original identities are lost. 89 As his report recommending the introduction of citizenship education put it, part of the groundswell for its recent emergence is undoubtedly a sense of "civic deficit"
epitomized by voter apathy amongst young people which the report claims "is inexcusably bad and should and could be remedied". 90 To this end the QCA, under the commission chaired by Crick, recommended the implementation of a co-ordinated national strategy for the statutory requirement for schools to spend around 5 percent of their curriculum time teaching three interdependent elements of citizenship education. These would comprise (i) social and moral responsibility, (ii) community involvement, and (iii) political literacy.
While these reiterate elements of the Swann Commission, they perhaps also constitute a modification of earlier approaches. Though the QCA insisted upon respect for "the plurality of nations, cultures, ethnic identities, and religions long established in the UK", there is no explicit reference to anti-racism which confirmed to some that citizenship education represents a disengagement from these issues. 91 Osler and Starkey 92 , for example, charge the QCA report with "institutional racism" for demanding that "minorities must learn to respect the laws, codes and conventions as much as the majority". 93 This they take as evidence of a "colonial approach…that runs throughout the report" and which "falls into the trap of treating certain ethnicities as 'Other' when it discusses cultural diversity". 94 Sir Bernard Crick repudiates the view that his committee singled out minorities, saying that
Were not willing to give the public the view that the major thrust of citizenship was race relations. We said damn it, it's about the whole population including the majority…pupils should learn, respect and have knowledge of national, regional ethnic and religious differences. We were simply taking a broader view. We thought that…all our nations' children should receive an education that would help them to become active citizens:
all our nations' children.
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This need not be evidence of an assimilatory "retreat" from anti-racism or multiculturalism, however, but something that might be characterized as a "rebalancing" of broader discourses of anti-racism and multiculturalism. Indeed, the entire idea of "citizenship education" is in itself surely evidence of this. While the latter point is welcomed by some commentators who had previously formed part of the pluralistic or anti-racist left identified earlier, the bringing of previously marginalized groups into the societal mainstream is, at best, greeted more ambivalently. 96 It is difficult, however, not to view this as a knee-jerk reaction that condemns religious identities per se, rather than examining them on a case-by-case basis, while at the same time assuming that ethnic identities are free of illiberal goals. This is empirically problematic given that clitoridectomy, for instance, is an example of a cultural practice among various ethnic groups and yet has little support from any religion. So to favour ethnicity and problematize religion is a reflection of a secularist bias that has alienated many religionists, especially Muslims, from multiculturalism.
It is much better to acknowledge that the 'multi' in multiculturalism will encompass different kinds of groups and does not itself privilege any one kind, but that 'recognition' should be given to the identities that marginalized groups themselves value and find strength in, whether these be racial, religious or ethnic.
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Conclusion
This chapter has charted the contemporary structural and cultural dynamics informing relationships between British Muslim identity articulations and the state. Traversing areas of political participation, observance of aspects of Shar'ia in personal and civil matters, spatial settlement and educational social mobility, and community consultation in preventing violent extremism, the chapter has elaborated how responses to Muslim 'difference' in Britain detail a pattern of engagement that has evolved over a period of time through both race-equality and multi-faith opportunity structures. In a cumulative way, developments in each have come to characterize a British multiculturalism that has, contrary to popular insistence following the London bombings, not been erased. As such we contend that any discussion of Muslim minorities in 21 st century Britain must not ignore these developments for they too may affect the course of future state-Muslim engagement -a point worth stressing as we stand on the threshold of new era of Conservative electoral dominance in British politics.
